## The Importance of Responsible Debt Management

## Poor State Bond Structuring Choices Lead to Greater Costs for Taxpayers

March 2024

## Message from the Comptroller

March 2024

Like many states, New York borrows to finance many of its capital projects, including those to build and improve roads, bridges, parks and buildings. This type of borrowing is appropriate because current and future users share in the cost of an asset from which they benefit. However, while there are longstanding norms about the best ways to structure such borrowing, municipal governments and public authorities have latitude to make bond structuring decisions, and these decisions can have significant long-term fiscal impacts.

In the throes of the economic uncertainty and fiscal turbulence caused by the
 COVID crisis, legislation was enacted as part of the SFY 2021-22 budget authorizing the use of Statesupported bonding with final maturities up to 50 years for capital purposes for the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA). This legislation has been reauthorized annually despite the State's much improved and stabilized fiscal condition, and has been proposed again in the State Fiscal Year (SFY) 2024-25 Executive Budget. The State has conducted three borrowings under this authorization in a manner that diverges from long-standing State debt financing norms and trades marginal short-term budget relief for greatly increased outyear costs. To date, the result has been nearly $\$ 1.2$ billion in increased costs, while providing financial plan relief of less than $\$ 78$ million. These results are particularly troublesome when considering the broader context of the State's high debt burdens. As we approach the State's coming 2024-25 fiscal year, the budget proposal authorizing such 50-year borrowing should be rejected, and the State should return to long-standing bond financing norms.

These three borrowings for the MTA were completed as competitive deals, which do not require review by the Comptroller's Office. My Office plays an important role in guarding against poor bond structuring decisions through the Comptroller's approval of the terms and conditions of private or negotiated bond sales by public authorities. The SFY 2024-25 Executive Budget also includes a proposal to severely restrict the State Comptroller's terms and conditions oversight of private sales of State debt, which should be rejected.

Thomas P. DiNapoli
State Comptroller

## Why Is Bond Structuring Important?

Many public entities in New York use debt to finance major capital projects. The use of debt is appropriate for infrastructure and other capital assets; since these assets are expected to serve the public for a long time, it is fair for future users to pay part of the cost of the project. This concept is referred to as generational equity, and is usually achieved by equitably spreading the repayment of annual debt service costs (principal and interest payments) over a time frame associated with the asset's useful life. Level or declining debt service is a long-standing bond financing norm and the default practice for most bond issuers in the municipal market.

Various laws, policies and guidelines enshrine best practices for structuring bonds to ensure generational equity. These statutory and other safeguards are important because the structuring of each new borrowing can have a significant impact on the annual and cumulative costs of repaying such debt. Over time, the costs from each new borrowing creates a cumulatively layered impact, typically increasing the annual costs for repaying such debt and the proportion of the issuer's annual budget priorities that are consumed by fixed costs.

Even when utilizing level debt service, a good deal of discretion and flexibility is afforded through other structuring considerations that can have significant impacts on the overall costs to taxpayers. These include:

- Timing: When the bond will be repaid, or its final maturity; the use of short-term and long-term maturities; and how debt service is amortized during that term.
- Purpose: Bonds can be issued to fund a new capital work or purpose or refinance existing bonds, or both.
- Taxability: Governmental entities benefit from the use of tax-exempt debt for their capital assets, which typically allows them to provide a lower interest rate than taxable debt. Nevertheless, governmental entities also employ taxable debt, often in combination with tax-exempt debt. Taxable bonds can be used to finance the portion of assets that have private use considerations, where non-governmental purposes may be included.
- Interest Rate: Can be fixed or variable. Governments can also use more sophisticated instruments, such as interest rate swaps.

Effective bond structures produce the lowest borrowing cost reasonably possible under market conditions at the time of issuance, reducing the burden of repayment over the life of such debt. To illustrate how structuring decisions can result in real differences for taxpayers, Figure 1 below shows how cost savings can be generated when bond structuring choices are implemented responsibly and effectively. In this example of a 30-year borrowing, both taxable and tax-exempt bonds are used to generate roughly $\$ 550$ million for capital projects. In the first example, both taxable and tax-exempt bonds are paid off throughout the 30-year period creating a level debt service repayment schedule. In the second scenario, the higher-cost taxable bonds are front-loaded into the earliest bond maturities meaning they are paid off first - and the lower-cost tax-exempt bonds have the longer maturities. Optimizing the structure as in scenario B produces a lower cost of borrowing, saving the issuer nearly $\$ 16$ million throughout the life of the debt.

Figure 1
Two Scenarios Illustrating Bond Structure Optimization
(Thousands of Dollars)

| Scenario A |  |  |  |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| FY End | 30-Year Level DS <br> Principal <br> Roth TX and TE <br> Interest |  |  |
| 2024 | $\$ 0$ | $\$ 27,094$ | Debt Service |
| 2025 | 8,520 | 27,948 | 36,094 |
| 2026 | 8,950 | 27,517 | 36,467 |
| 2027 | 9,400 | 27,066 | 36,466 |
| 2028 | 9,880 | 26,591 | 36,471 |
| 2029 | 10,380 | 26,092 | 36,472 |
| 2030 | 10,905 | 25,565 | 36,470 |
| 2031 | 11,455 | 25,011 | 36,466 |
| 2032 | 12,045 | 24,427 | 36,472 |
| 2033 | 12,660 | 23,812 | 36,472 |
| 2034 | 13,305 | 23,165 | 36,470 |
| 2035 | 13,985 | 22,483 | 36,468 |
| 2036 | 14,705 | 21,764 | 36,469 |
| 2037 | 15,465 | 21,006 | 36,471 |
| 2038 | 16,260 | 20,209 | 36,469 |
| 2039 | 17,100 | 19,369 | 36,469 |
| 2040 | 17,985 | 18,485 | 36,470 |
| 2041 | 18,915 | 17,555 | 36,470 |
| 2042 | 19,895 | 16,577 | 36,472 |
| 2043 | 20,920 | 15,548 | 36,468 |
| 2044 | 22,005 | 14,465 | 36,470 |
| 2045 | 23,140 | 13,326 | 36,466 |
| 2046 | 24,340 | 12,128 | 36,468 |
| 2047 | 25,605 | 10,868 | 36,473 |
| 2048 | 26,930 | 9,541 | 36,471 |
| 2049 | 28,325 | 8,146 | 36,471 |
| 2050 | 29,795 | 6,678 | 36,473 |
| 2051 | 31,335 | 5,133 | 36,468 |
| 2052 | 32,960 | 3,509 | 36,469 |
| 2053 | 34,670 | 1,799 | 36,469 |
| Total | $\$ 541,835$ | $\$ 542,875$ | $\$ 1,084,710$ |
|  |  |  |  |


| Scenario B |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Optimized Structure: 30-Year Level DS - Short TX \& Long TE |  |  |  |
| Principal | Interest | Debt Service | Savings |
| \$0 | \$26,708 | \$26,708 | (\$385) |
| 8,390 | 27,550 | 35,940 | (528) |
| 8,840 | 27,100 | 35,940 | (527) |
| 9,305 | 26,634 | 35,939 | (526) |
| 9,800 | 26,140 | 35,940 | (531) |
| 10,320 | 25,618 | 35,938 | (534) |
| 10,885 | 25,053 | 35,938 | (532) |
| 11,485 | 24,453 | 35,938 | (528) |
| 12,130 | 23,807 | 35,937 | (535) |
| 12,820 | 23,121 | 35,941 | (531) |
| 13,545 | 22,393 | 35,938 | (531) |
| 14,220 | 21,716 | 35,936 | (532) |
| 14,935 | 21,005 | 35,940 | (529) |
| 15,680 | 20,258 | 35,938 | (533) |
| 16,465 | 19,474 | 35,939 | (529) |
| 17,285 | 18,651 | 35,936 | (533) |
| 18,150 | 17,787 | 35,937 | (533) |
| 19,060 | 16,879 | 35,939 | (531) |
| 20,010 | 15,926 | 35,936 | (536) |
| 21,010 | 14,926 | 35,936 | (532) |
| 22,065 | 13,875 | 35,940 | (530) |
| 23,165 | 12,772 | 35,937 | (529) |
| 24,325 | 11,614 | 35,939 | (530) |
| 25,540 | 10,398 | 35,938 | (535) |
| 26,820 | 9,121 | 35,941 | (531) |
| 28,160 | 7,780 | 35,940 | (532) |
| 29,565 | 6,372 | 35,937 | (537) |
| 31,045 | 4,893 | 35,938 | (530) |
| 32,595 | 3,341 | 35,936 | (533) |
| 34,225 | 1,711 | 35,936 | (533) |
| \$541,840 | \$527,076 | \$1,068,916 | $(\$ 15,794)$ |

[^0]Responsible bond structuring reflects sound budget management, ensuring that costs remain reasonable in the short- and long-term. Municipal bond structures can also be used less prudently to provide short-sighted budget relief while increasing long-term costs, particularly to future generations of taxpayers. Examples include so-called "scoop and toss" refunding approaches that prolong the repayment of debt, "wrap" structures to delay repayment of principal, and the use of "bullet" maturities that schedule total repayment at the end of the maturity, which can all provide near-term budget relief while increasing total costs relative to other alternative structures. ${ }^{1}$ This is especially the case when the repayment of bonds is extended over a greater period of time, which both requires higher interest rates for longer-maturity bonds and increases the amount of time during which interest costs must be repaid.

## Budget Legislation Undercuts Debt Reform Act

The Debt Reform Act of 2000 (State Finance Law, Article 5-B) precludes the issuance of Statesupported debt with a final maturity of more than 30 years. ${ }^{2}$ Longer-term debt is perceived by investors to be riskier, and typically requires a higher interest rate, making the borrowing relatively more costly. In the wake of the fiscal crisis brought about by the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, an exception to this limitation was first authorized in legislation enacted as part of the State Fiscal Year 2021-22 Budget. This allowed, for that fiscal year, the issuance of State-supported debt for the purposes of financing transportation facilities of the MTA with final maturities of up to 50 years. However, this authorization has been extended annually in each ensuing State budget. The Governor's SFY 2024-25 Executive Budget once again proposes extending this authorization for one additional year in the Public Protection and General Government Article VII bill (A. 8805 / S.8305), Part X, section $56 .{ }^{3}$

The initial authorization of this legislation was spurred by COVID's grim early impacts on the MTA's ridership and finances, which hampered the MTA's ability to issue its own debt in the bond market for a time. Prior to COVID, State support for the MTA's capital plan was to include State assistance payments that would indirectly support a portion of MTA's borrowings. With the expectation of State support for the MTA's capital program and the MTA's borrowing plans hindered by the impacts of COVID, the budget legislation allowed the State to step in and substitute its Personal Income Tax (PIT) or Sales Tax (ST)-backed revenue bonds for a portion of MTA's own borrowing plans. The extended maturities were authorized to correspond to that which the MTA had expected to issue on its own. State PIT and ST revenue bonds are issued by the NYS Thruway Authority, Empire State Development (ESD) and the Dormitory Authority of the State of NY (DASNY), with debt service repaid by the State.

Municipal bonds with maturities beyond 30 years are rare in the bond market: in fact, the Municipal Market Data (MMD) bond index - the bond market's industry benchmark for measuring interest costs does not go beyond 30 years. Federal treasury bonds, backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government, also do not go beyond 30 years.

## State Issuances for MTA Result in Significantly Higher Costs

The fiscal impacts of allowing maturities of up to 50 years for MTA purposes are considerable. While providing some marginal short-term budget relief in the early years, it has drastically increased total long-term costs. This results from both higher interest costs from longer-maturity bonds and paying interest on such bonds over a significantly extended period of time.

Since the legislation's original adoption in the State's 2021-22 fiscal year and subsequent annual extensions, State-supported debt has financed about $\$ 6$ billion for MTA transportation purposes. These debt issuances have each been issued under the State's PIT Revenue Bond credit, with repayment by the State subject to annual appropriation. Much has been issued in a responsible manner, consistent with long-standing bond structuring norms for State debt and the Debt Reform Act's 30 -year maturity limit. However, over $\$ 1.7$ billion of the total $\$ 6$ billion for MTA projects have been financed with maturities longer than 30 years.

Even worse is the manner in which the annual budget legislation exempting the MTA has been deployed in these cases. Each issue has "backloaded" the principal borrowed for these MTA purposes into extended years. These bond amounts are "wrapped" to follow behind the repayment of debt for other State capital purposes with the typical 30-year level debt service structure. ${ }^{4}$ In addition to diverging from long-standing bond structuring norms and creating higher costs, this also moves away from the concept of generational equity by making future taxpayers shoulder an unequal and outsized portion of financing these project costs. This Office has previously reported on similar "backloading" debt practices by the MTA itself. ${ }^{5}$

To date, the short-term budget "relief" from these measures - typically measured over each annual budget's four-year financial plan horizon - has been less than $\$ 78$ million. In contrast, these same poor bond structuring choices have increased total State costs over the life of the debt by nearly $\$ 1.2$ billion as compared to a traditional bond structure with level debt service. (See Appendix for detailed comparisons.)

Figure 2
Actual "Backloaded" Bond Structures Compared to 30-Year Level Debt Service


[^1]Since 2020, the State's finances have experienced a dramatic turnaround. Strong State cash positions in recent years have permitted the State to take positive debt actions, including $\$ 9$ billion of additional pay-as-you-go funding and debt service prepayments and defeasances in each year since the budget legislation was originally enacted, totaling nearly $\$ 17$ billion. These strategies prudently reduce future debt costs, and greatly contrast with the State's use of "backloaded" and extended maturities, which have added substantial long-term fixed costs.

Considering the magnitude of the available pay-as-you-go funding and the flexibility in how it can be deployed, some very small portion of either the pay-as-you-go funding or prepayment actions could be utilized to end these costly bond structures by creating alternative debt-related relief during the fouryear financial plan horizon.

Each of the three State PIT bond issues discussed above were sold by competitive sale, meaning they were not subject to review and approval by the Office of the State Comptroller. ${ }^{6}$

## Conclusion

In the context of the post-COVID economic recovery, much has been done to bolster the State's finances, including considerable increases to State reserve fund levels. This commendable focus on prioritizing a longer-term outlook for the State's fiscal health should not disregard its bond financing practices.

Maturities of up to 50 years should not be considered a "new norm." The SFY 2024-25 Executive Budget's proposal to further authorize the use of bond maturities up to 50 years for MTA transportation facilities should be rejected, allowing it to finally sunset at the end of the current fiscal year. This will revert all State borrowings to the 30-year final maturity limitation otherwise embodied in the Debt Reform Act. The State should also prioritize a return to long-standing bond financing norms, including the use of level debt service structures. The deployment of bond structures with "backloaded" and extended principal amortization schedules, such as done for these MTA capital expenses, has been very costly.

As noted in this Office's Report on the SFY 2024-25 Executive Budget, the troubling new proposal to restrict the State Comptroller's ability to review and approve negotiated State PIT and Sales Tax bond issues should be rejected. ${ }^{7}$ Reduced oversight by the State Comptroller would eliminate guardrails for debt issued through negotiated sales, and potentially lead to higher costs for taxpayers. This would also create a dangerous legislative precedent, likely to be sought by other public authority bond issuers.

## Appendix A

## Analysis of Costs of Backloaded and Extended Maturities

## 2021 - NYS Thruway Authority PIT Revenue Bonds, Series 2021A-1

(Dollars in Thousands)

Actual - Deferred Principal \& 38-Year Maturity

| FY End | Principal | Interest | Debt Service |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 2022 |  | $\$ 15,661$ | $\$ 15,661$ |
| 2023 |  | 24,837 | 24,837 |
| 2024 |  | 24,837 | 24,837 |
| 2025 |  | 24,837 | 24,837 |
| 2026 |  | 24,837 | 24,837 |
| 2027 |  | 24,837 | 24,837 |
| 2028 |  | 24,837 | 24,837 |
| 2029 |  | 24,837 | 24,837 |
| 2030 |  | 24,837 | 24,837 |
| 2031 |  | 24,837 | 24,837 |
| 2032 |  | 24,837 | 24,837 |
| 2033 |  | 24,837 | 24,837 |
| 2034 |  | 24,837 | 24,837 |
| 2035 |  | 24,837 | 24,837 |
| 2036 |  | 24,837 | 24,837 |
| 2037 |  | 24,837 | 24,837 |
| 2038 |  | 24,837 | 24,837 |
| 2039 |  | 24,837 | 24,837 |
| 2040 |  | 24,837 | 24,837 |
| 2041 |  | 24,837 | 24,837 |
| 2042 |  | 24,837 | 24,837 |
| 2043 |  | 24,837 | 24,837 |
| 2044 |  | 24,837 | 24,837 |
| 2045 |  | 24,837 | 24,837 |
| 2046 |  | 24,837 | 24,837 |
| 2047 |  | 24,837 | 24,837 |
| 2048 |  | 24,837 | 24,837 |
| 2049 |  | 24,837 | 24,837 |
| 2050 |  | 24,837 | 24,837 |
| 2051 |  |  | 24,837 |
| 2052 | 63,965 | 73,802 |  |
| 2053 | 65,940 | 23,368 | 86,768 |
| 2054 | 68,575 | 20,832 | 86,772 |
| 2055 | 71,320 | 18,195 | 86,770 |
| 2056 | 74,170 | 12,459 | 86,772 |
| 2057 | 77,140 | 9,632 | 86,769 |
| 2058 | 80,225 | 6,546 | 86,772 |
| 2059 | 83,435 | 3,337 | 86,771 |
| Total | $\$ 633,170$ | $\$ 845,900$ | $\$ 1,479,0772$ |
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |

Level DS - 30 -Year Final Maturity

| Principal | Interest | Debt Service | $\begin{gathered} \text { (Savings) } / \\ \text { Cost } \end{gathered}$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | \$15,867 | \$15,867 | (\$206) |  |
| 10,495 | 25,164 | 35,659 | $(10,822)$ | Short-term Budget |
| 11,020 | 24,639 | 35,659 | $(10,822)$ | Relief (\$32.7m) |
| 11,570 | 24,088 | 35,658 | $(10,821)$ |  |
| 12,150 | 23,509 | 35,659 | $(10,822)$ |  |
| 12,755 | 22,902 | 35,657 | $(10,820)$ |  |
| 13,395 | 22,264 | 35,659 | $(10,822)$ |  |
| 14,060 | 21,594 | 35,654 | $(10,817)$ |  |
| 14,765 | 20,891 | 35,656 | $(10,819)$ |  |
| 15,505 | 20,153 | 35,658 | $(10,821)$ |  |
| 16,280 | 19,378 | 35,658 | $(10,821)$ |  |
| 17,095 | 18,564 | 35,659 | $(10,822)$ |  |
| 17,950 | 17,709 | 35,659 | $(10,822)$ |  |
| 18,845 | 16,812 | 35,657 | $(10,820)$ |  |
| 19,790 | 15,869 | 35,659 | $(10,822)$ |  |
| 20,580 | 15,078 | 35,658 | $(10,821)$ |  |
| 21,400 | 14,255 | 35,655 | $(10,817)$ |  |
| 22,260 | 13,399 | 35,659 | $(10,821)$ |  |
| 23,150 | 12,508 | 35,658 | $(10,821)$ |  |
| 24,075 | 11,582 | 35,657 | $(10,820)$ |  |
| 25,040 | 10,619 | 35,659 | $(10,822)$ |  |
| 26,040 | 9,618 | 35,658 | $(10,820)$ |  |
| 27,080 | 8,576 | 35,656 | $(10,819)$ |  |
| 28,165 | 7,493 | 35,658 | $(10,821)$ |  |
| 29,290 | 6,366 | 35,656 | $(10,819)$ |  |
| 30,460 | 5,195 | 35,655 | $(10,817)$ |  |
| 31,680 | 3,976 | 35,656 | $(10,819)$ |  |
| 32,630 | 3,026 | 35,656 | $(10,819)$ |  |
| 33,610 | 2,047 | 35,657 | $(10,820)$ |  |
| 34,620 | 1,039 | 35,659 | 38,144 |  |
|  |  |  | 86,768 |  |
|  |  |  | 86,772 |  |
|  |  |  | 86,770 |  |
|  |  |  | 86,772 |  |
|  |  |  | 86,769 |  |
|  |  |  | 86,772 |  |
|  |  |  | 86,771 |  |
|  |  |  | 86,772 | Total |
| \$615,755 | \$434,179 | \$1,049,934 | \$429,136 | Increased Costs |

Notes: Deferred principal reflects actual results from the Thruway Authority's Series 2021A-1 bond issue. Level debt service reflects OSC estimate of financing the same costs with a 30 -year level debt service bond structure, utilizing the actual interest rates, yields and other bond terms and conditions from bonds issued at the same time. Short-term budget relief reflects the typical measurement used for each annual budget cycle's four-year financial plan.

## 2022 - NYS Thruway Authority PIT Revenue Bonds, Series 2022C (Dollars in Thousands)

Actual - Deferred Principal \& 35-Year Maturity

| FY End | Principal | Interest | Debt Service |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 2023 |  | $\$ 21,453$ | $\$ 21,453$ |
| 2024 |  | 34,023 | 34,023 |
| 2025 |  | 34,023 | 34,023 |
| 2026 |  | 34,023 | 34,023 |
| 2027 |  | 34,023 | 34,023 |
| 2028 |  | 34,023 | 34,023 |
| 2029 |  | 34,023 | 34,023 |
| 2030 |  | 34,023 | 34,023 |
| 2031 |  | 34,023 | 34,023 |
| 2032 |  | 34,023 | 34,023 |
| 2033 |  | 34,023 | 34,023 |
| 2034 |  | 34,023 | 34,023 |
| 2035 |  | 34,023 | 34,023 |
| 2036 |  | 34,023 | 34,023 |
| 2037 |  | 34,023 | 34,023 |
| 2038 |  | 34,023 | 34,023 |
| 2039 |  | 34,023 | 34,023 |
| 2040 |  | 34,023 | 34,023 |
| 2041 |  | 34,023 | 34,023 |
| 2042 |  | 34,023 | 34,023 |
| 2043 |  | 34,023 | 34,023 |
| 2044 |  | 34,023 | 34,023 |
| 2045 |  | 34,023 | 34,023 |
| 2046 |  | 34,023 | 34,023 |
| 2047 |  | 34,023 | 34,023 |
| 2048 |  | 34,023 | 34,023 |
| 2049 |  | 34,023 | 34,023 |
| 2050 |  | 34,023 | 34,023 |
| 2051 |  | 34,023 | 74,818 |
| 2052 | 40,795 | 31,983 | 157,363 |
| 2053 | 125,380 | 25,714 | 157,359 |
| 2054 | 131,645 | 19,132 | 157,357 |
| 2055 | 138,225 | 12,221 | 157,356 |
| 2056 | 145,135 | 1234 | 157,359 |
| 2057 | 151,125 | 6,234 |  |
| Total | $\$ 732,305$ | $\$ 1,103,404$ | $\$ 1,835,709$ |
|  |  |  |  |

Level DS - 30-Year Final Maturity


Notes: Deferred principal reflects actual results from the Thruway Authority's Series 2022C bond issue. Level debt service reflects OSC estimate of financing the same costs with a 30 -year level debt service bond structure, utilizing the actual interest rates, yields and other bond terms and conditions from bonds issued at the same time. Short-term budget relief reflects the typical measurement used for each annual budget cycle's four-year financial plan.

| Actual - 40-Year Maturity |  |  |  | Level DS - 30-Year Final Maturity |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| FY End | Principal | Interest | Debt Service | Principal | Interest | Debt Service | (Savings) / Cost |  |
| 2024 |  | \$2,822 | \$2,822 |  | \$2,647 | \$2,647 | \$175 |  |
| 2025 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 3,880 | 11,344 | 15,224 | $(3,130)$ | Short-term Budget |
| 2026 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 4,075 | 11,150 | 15,225 | $(3,131)$ | Relief (\$9.2m) |
| 2027 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 4,280 | 10,946 | 15,226 | $(3,132)$ |  |
| 2028 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 4,490 | 10,732 | 15,222 | $(3,128)$ |  |
| 2029 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 4,715 | 10,508 | 15,223 | $(3,128)$ |  |
| 2030 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 4,950 | 10,272 | 15,222 | $(3,128)$ |  |
| 2031 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 5,200 | 10,024 | 15,224 | $(3,130)$ |  |
| 2032 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 5,460 | 9,764 | 15,224 | $(3,130)$ |  |
| 2033 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 5,730 | 9,491 | 15,221 | $(3,127)$ |  |
| 2034 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 6,020 | 9,205 | 15,225 | $(3,131)$ |  |
| 2035 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 6,320 | 8,904 | 15,224 | $(3,130)$ |  |
| 2036 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 6,635 | 8,588 | 15,223 | $(3,129)$ |  |
| 2037 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 6,970 | 8,256 | 15,226 | $(3,132)$ |  |
| 2038 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 7,315 | 7,908 | 15,223 | $(3,128)$ |  |
| 2039 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 7,680 | 7,542 | 15,222 | $(3,128)$ |  |
| 2040 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 8,065 | 7,158 | 15,223 | $(3,129)$ |  |
| 2041 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 8,470 | 6,755 | 15,225 | $(3,130)$ |  |
| 2042 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 8,890 | 6,331 | 15,221 | $(3,127)$ |  |
| 2043 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 9,335 | 5,887 | 15,222 | $(3,127)$ |  |
| 2044 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 9,805 | 5,420 | 15,225 | $(3,131)$ |  |
| 2045 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 10,295 | 4,930 | 15,225 | $(3,130)$ |  |
| 2046 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 10,810 | 4,415 | 15,225 | $(3,131)$ |  |
| 2047 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 11,350 | 3,874 | 15,224 | $(3,130)$ |  |
| 2048 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 11,915 | 3,307 | 15,222 | $(3,128)$ |  |
| 2049 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 12,510 | 2,711 | 15,221 | $(3,127)$ |  |
| 2050 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 13,015 | 2,211 | 15,226 | $(3,131)$ |  |
| 2051 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 13,535 | 1,690 | 15,225 | $(3,131)$ |  |
| 2052 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 14,075 | 1,149 | 15,224 | $(3,129)$ |  |
| 2053 |  | 12,094 | 12,094 | 14,640 | 586 | 15,226 | $(3,131)$ |  |
| 2054 | 19,230 | 12,094 | 31,324 |  |  |  | 31,324 |  |
| 2055 | 20,195 | 11,133 | 31,328 |  |  |  | 31,328 |  |
| 2056 | 21,200 | 10,123 | 31,323 |  |  |  | 31,323 |  |
| 2057 | 22,260 | 9,063 | 31,323 |  |  |  | 31,323 |  |
| 2058 | 23,375 | 7,950 | 31,325 |  |  |  | 31,325 |  |
| 2059 | 24,545 | 6,781 | 31,326 |  |  |  | 31,326 |  |
| 2060 | 25,770 | 5,554 | 31,324 |  |  |  | 31,324 |  |
| 2061 | 27,060 | 4,266 | 31,326 |  |  |  | 31,326 |  |
| 2062 | 28,415 | 2,913 | 31,328 |  |  |  | 31,328 |  |
| 2063 | 29,835 | 1,492 | 31,327 |  |  |  | 31,327 | Total |
| Total | \$241,885 | \$424,923 | \$666,808 | \$240,430 | \$203,699 | \$444,129 | \$222,679 | Increased Costs |

Notes: Deferred principal reflects actual results from ESD's Series 2023A bond issue with maturities greater than 30 years. Level debt service reflects OSC estimate of financing the same costs with a 30 -year level debt service bond structure, utilizing the actual interest rates, yields and other bond terms and conditions from bonds issued at the same time. Short-term budget relief reflects the typical measurement used for each annual budget cycle's four-year financial plan.

## Appendix B

## Section 1

SFY 2024-25 Executive Budget, Public Protection and General Government Article VII bill (A. 8805 / S.8305), Part X, section 56.
§ 56. Subdivision 1 of section 386 -a of the public authorities law, as amended by section 54 of part PP of chapter 56 of the laws of 2023, is amended to read as follows:

1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the authority, the dormitory authority and the urban development corporation are hereby authorized to issue bonds or notes in one or more series for the purpose of assisting the metropolitan transportation authority in the financing of transportation facilities as defined in subdivision seventeen of section twelve hundred sixty-one of this chapter or other capital projects. The aggregate principal amount of bonds authorized to be issued pursuant to this section shall not exceed twelve billion five hundred fifteen million eight hundred fifty-six thousand dollars $\$ 12,515,856,000$, excluding bonds issued to fund one or more debt service reserve funds, to pay costs of issuance of such bonds, and to refund or otherwise repay such bonds or notes previously issued. Such bonds and notes of the authority, the dormitory authority and the urban development corporation shall not be a debt of the state, and the state shall not be liable thereon, nor shall they be payable out of any funds other than those appropriated by the state to the authority, the dormitory authority and the urban development corporation for principal, interest, and related expenses pursuant to a service contract and such bonds and notes shall contain on the face thereof a statement to such effect. Except for purposes of complying with the internal revenue code, any interest income earned on bond proceeds shall only be used to pay debt service on such bonds. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, including the limitations contained in subdivision four of section sixty-seven-b of the state finance law, (A) any bonds and notes issued prior to April first, two thousand [twenty-four] twenty-five pursuant to this section may be issued with a maximum maturity of fifty years, and (B) any bonds issued to refund such bonds and notes may be issued with a maximum maturity of fifty years from the respective date of original issuance of such bonds and notes.

SFY 2024-25 Executive Budget, Public Protection and General Government Article VII bill (A. 8805 / S.8305), Part X, sections 49 and 50.
§ 49. Paragraph (g) of subdivision 1 of section 68-b of the state finance law, as added by section 2 of part I of chapter 383 of the laws of 2001, is amended to read as follows:
(g) Revenue bonds authorized hereunder shall be sold by authorized issuers, at public or private sale, at such price or prices as the authorized issuers may determine. Revenue bonds of the authorized issuers shall not be sold by the authorized issuers at private sales unless such sale and the terms thereof have been approved by the state comptroller. The approval of the private sale of such bonds and the terms thereof by the state comptroller shall be limited to a review of (i) the reasonableness of: (1) the bond pricing, taking into account current interest rates; (2) the costs of issuance and underwriters discount for such bonds; (3) if the sale includes refunding bonds, cash flow savings and net present value savings; and (4) if the sale involves an interest rate exchange or similar agreement, the economic terms of such agreement; and (ii) whether the final maturity of the bonds complies with (1) the legal authorization for the project or projects being financed, and (2) the parameters established in the authorized issuer's resolution authorizing the issuance of such bonds, as approved by the public authorities control board pursuant to section fifty-one of the public authorities law.
§ 50. Paragraph ( g ) of subdivision 1 of section $69-\mathrm{n}$ of the state finance law, as added by section 58 of part HH of chapter 57 of the laws of 2013, is amended to read as follows:
(g) Revenue bonds authorized hereunder shall be sold by authorized issuers, at public or private sale, at such price or prices as the authorized issuers may determine. Revenue bonds of the authorized issuers shall not be sold by the authorized issuers at private sales unless such sale and the terms thereof have been approved by the state comptroller. The approval of the private sale of such bonds and the terms thereof by the state comptroller shall be limited to a review of (i) the reasonableness of: (1) the bond pricing, taking into account current interest rates; (2) the costs of issuance and underwriters discount for such bonds; (3) if the sale includes refunding bonds, cash flow savings and net present value savings; and (4) if the sale involves an interest rate exchange or similar agreement, the economic terms of such agreement; and (ii) whether the final maturity of the bonds complies with (1) the legal authorization for the project or projects being financed, and (2) the parameters established in the authorized issuer's resolution authorizing the issuance of such bonds, as approved by the public authorities control board pursuant to section fifty-one of the public authorities law.

## Endnotes

1 "Scoop and toss" refundings typically restructure existing bonds maturing over a shorter-term horizon to defer their repayment into much later years. "Wrap" bond structures typically defer the repayment of a new bond issue into future years, layering it upon an existing debt structure that may decline over time. "Bullet" maturity bonds typically defer any repayment of principal until a single long-term date at final maturity.
${ }^{2}$ State-supported debt includes both voter-approved, full faith and credit State General Obligation debt as well as "backdoor borrowings" by public authorities, where the State is contractually obligated to repay debt service, subject to appropriation.
${ }^{3}$ Public Protection and General Government Article VII bill (A. 8805 / S.8305), Part X, section 56. See Appendix B, section 1.
${ }^{4}$ The 2023 issuance was structured differently - with an overall level debt service approach for MTA purposes, although with the longest final maturity to date of 40 years. For comparability, this analysis only considers those 2023 bonds issued beyond 30 years.
${ }^{5}$ Most recently: Office of the State Comptroller, "Annual Update: Metropolitan Transportation Authority's Debt Profile", May 2023.
${ }^{6}$ The 2023 borrowing was initially to be issued by DASNY and came before the Public Authorities Control Board (PACB) for approval in May 2023. While the Comptroller is not a board member of the PACB, by statute the Comptroller reviews and comments on applications to PACB. In a letter dated May 17, 2023, the Office of the State Comptroller provided comments to PACB on the proposed DASNY bond issue's intended use of bonds for MTA purposes with a final maturity up to 50 years, noting the increased interest costs they would require and urging a return to more prudent debt practices. As a negotiated sale, the DASNY issuance was subject to the Comptroller's terms and conditions approval. The Office of the State Comptroller objected to the bond structure for MTA purposes, and this component was withdrawn from the DASNY issuance before going to market. It was subsequently reintroduced as part of the ESD PIT bond application that came before the PACB in November 2023. In a letter dated November 15, 2023, the Office of the State Comptroller once again provided comment indicating its concerns to the PACB. The ESD bond issuance was ultimately conducted in December 2023 as a competitive sale, which did not require the State Comptroller's approval.
${ }^{7}$ Public Protection and General Government Article VII bill (A. 8805 / S.8305), Part X, sections 49 and 50. See Appendix B, section 2.

## Contact

Office of the New York State Comptroller 110 State Street
Albany, New York 12236
(518) 474-4044
www.osc.ny.gov

Prepared by the Office of Budget and Policy Analysis - Bureau of Debt Management
Maria Doulis, Deputy Comptroller
Pat Reale, Assistant Deputy Comptroller
Todd Scheuermann, Assistant Deputy Comptroller
Charles Trimbach, Director
Christian Brass, Principal Analyst
Trevor Skiba, Associate Analyst


[^0]:    = Both Taxable and Tax-Exempt Bonds
    = Taxable Bonds Only
    = Tax-Exempt Bonds Only

[^1]:    Source: Actual bond sale results and Office of the State Comptroller estimates

